Major John George Brew - 1918: Retreat from St. Quentin

Back to Messines, Ypres and Cambrai

1918 - Retreat from St. Quentin

The first six days of the new year were spent by the 9th Irish Fusiliers in Boves undergoing training, but on 7 January they were on the move again. A 14km march that day, along a snow-covered route to Marcelcave, was followed on ensuing days by an 11km march to Rosières, north-west of Roye, and a 15km march to Carrépuis, east of Roye, where they arrived on 11 January. Two days later they marched a further 20km to Villeselve, south-west of St. Quentin, where the Division's 107th and 109th Brigades immediately moved forward to relieve the French 6th Division, while the 108th remained in reserve. During these movements, Divisional Headquarters was established in Nesle, but was promptly relocated to Ollézy on 14 January.

A final move of 13km northwards from Villeselve to Seraucourt-le-Grand (Grand Seraucourt) on 17 January positioned the 9th Irish Fusiliers just a short distance from the front. The length of the British front line had just been extended further south, and troops of the 107th and 109th Brigades were now occupying trenches recently held by French troops around the southern side of St. Quentin. The trenches in the Division's responsibility ran the length of some 6000 yards, between Sphinx Wood and the St. Quentin-Roisel railway line. Meanwhile, troops of the 108th Brigade were billeted in villages along the St. Quentin-Ham road, and Brigade Headquarters were set up just east of Ham in Dury. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' strength in the third week of January is recorded as being 39 officers, 866 other ranks, 39 horses and 16 mules.[1]

The Germans realised the French and been relieved and soon sent several raiding parties into the Division's lines to find out by whom. They succeeded in taking several prisoners of the 107th and 109th Brigades during the night of 22 January and obtained the answer. However, besides these small incidents, life seemed very quiet in the sector, one of the most easterly reaches of the Allied Somme front. Besides their main occupation during the latter half of January of digging trenches and improving existing ones, there was also time left for more enjoyable pastimes. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary gives us a clue:

The Ulster Division also took the opportunity to reorganise and bring in reinforcements to replace the devastating losses which Cambrai had inflicted. The 107th Brigade now consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 15th Royal Irish Rifles, the 108th consisted of the 12th Royal Irish Rifles and 1st and 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 109th became the 1st, 2nd, and 9th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

With it's usual touch of tongue-in-cheek sarcasm, the editorial of the January 1918 edition of the "B.E.F. Times" gives us an impression of the sentiments of the average British soldier as the new year dawned. For the first time, it offered the encouraging expectation that 1918 would, at last, be the final year of the war - actually quite a pretentious prognosis for the situation the British Armies were now in.

Quite prophetic indeed, but far too early to start celebrating; much was to occur between the new year and the end, when it finally came.

By the end of January, the 9th Irish Fusiliers had taken up position on the right sector of the Division's front line, where they had relieved the 14th Irish Rifles, and found the trenches in a poor state, having fallen in, in some places. Their War Diary notes that wire was plentiful and that the average distance between their trench and the German front line averaged 1000 yards. There was no lack of activity during their spell in the line; the men were sometimes bombed by enemy aircraft during the night, or came under artillery fire during the day.

Maj. John George Brew once again took temporary command of the Battalion during the latter half of January, while Lieut.-Colonel Kelly took leave. John George took responsibility for the Battalion War Diary for January, and undersigned it at the end of the month.

But this time, the mood among British troops had begun to become unsettled, as, like during the still before a storm, they were wary that something was brewing. During the first 10 days of February there was a marked increase of German artillery activity. British lines were suffering regular barrages and, on 11 February, John George Brew moved Battalion Headquarters to a new position. All too soon it would become apparent that their concerns were not unwarranted. On the British side of the front line, it was clear to the troops that they were now on a defensive footing. New reports of fresh German troops arriving on the Western Front were circulated almost daily and troops uneasily awaited the inevitable German offensive which they knew must arrive soon. From the 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary, it is clear that enemy activity of all types had massively increased. Artillery barrages of various sorts of ammunition soon became a daily occurrence, as was sniping and bombing from German aircraft.

Following the disbanding of the 7th/8th Irish Rifles, the 9th Irish Fusiliers received a draft of 9 officers and 213 other ranks on 16 February to bolster their numbers. Battalion strength now stood at 46 officers and 1066 other ranks.[5] Upon Lieut.-Colonel Kelly's return from leave on 19 February, Major Brew went to a 3 day conference hosted by the Corps Commander, General Sir Ivor Maxse.[6]

Though having her own problems of war-weariness at home, German morale had steadily grown with the unexpected Russian collapse and confidence took on new heights as troop strength increased in France. By March 1918, the number of German divisions on the Western Front had swelled to around 190, some 60 more than a year before, and continued to grow. The Allied armies were now becoming dangerously outnumbered and buoyed by this fact, General Ludendorff began to promise victory, but knew he would have to act fast with his new-found strength before the arrival of great numbers of American troops. Indeed, some 184,000 American troops were already in France by the end of January[7], and more were on there way. It was a great risk, certainly a race against time, and Ludendorff's strategists were planning an offensive of immense proportions.

Optimising Allied weaknesses, Ludendorff opted for a section of the front between Arras and St. Quentin, with the intention of dividing the Allied armies and forcing the British back to the Channel coast. His first and main strike, on the Somme, was code-named 'Michael', for which 74 Divisions, 6600 artillery pieces, 3500 mortars and 326 fighter aircraft would be deployed[8]. Subsequent diversionary attacks, planned to confuse his enemy, were called 'St. George I' and 'St. George II' , against the British at Lys at Ypres respectively, and 'Blücher' against the French at Champagne. This far reaching plan was much greater than Allied commanders ever envisaged.

In the St. Quentin sector, the German 18th Army, under General Oskar von Hutier, fresh from the Eastern Front, planned it's attack on each side of St. Quentin, aiming to sever British lines and divide the British and French armies. Von Hutier's Army, headquartered at Guise, boasted 27 Divisions. To gain an impression of what this means, it is necessary to know that the average strength of a German Division in 1918 stood at 12,300 men, 3000 horses, 48 artillery pieces, 120 mortars, 78 heavy machine guns, 144 light machine guns, and 6-12 trucks.[9]

The British Fifth Army commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, on the other hand, had at his disposal 12 Divisions, 1650 guns, and 119 tanks, and 357 aircraft. An average British division in 1918 consisted of 11,800 men, 3670 horses and mules, 48 artillery pieces, 36 mortars, 64 Vickers heavy machine guns, 144 Lewis light machine guns, 770 carts and wagons, 360 motorcycles and bicycles, 14 trucks and cars, and 21 motorised ambulances.[10]

From 22 February onwards, the Ulster Division changed strategy and maintained a three brigade front, with the 108th on the right, the 107th in the centre, and 109th on the left. Each brigade kept one battalion on the front line in the forward zone, the second in support in the battle zone, some 6000 yards behind the front and protected by wired redoubts, and the third in reserve in the rear zone.

According to records in the 9th Irish Fusiliers War Diary, this system was continued until the onset of the German offensive. At 17:30 on 1 March 1918, for the purpose of illustration, the 9th Irish Fusiliers moved out for Essigny Station to relieve their colleagues of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, and spent the next several days working on defences in the battle zone. Their effective strength at the time was reported as 46 Officers, 1083 O.R.s, 36 horses, and 16 mules. After a number of days at the front, they moved back into reserve again, relieved by the 1st Fusiliers. At 18:00 on 7 March, the battalion relieved the 1st Irish Fusiliers on the front line once again, and found themselves positioned with the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles of the 107th Brigade to their left, and the 8th King's Royal Rifles to their right.[11]

The main work of the Division throughout this period was improving defences, though some raiding was carried out to gauge the situation on the other side of No Man's Land. At 15:00 on 9 March, for example, 2nd Lieutenant W.G. Greenaway and 3 other ranks captured an enemy machine gun without opposition.[12]

Over the following days, the activities of the 9th Fusiliers were described as being,

On the evening of 15 March, after 18:30, the 9th Fusiliers were relieved on the line by the 12th Irish Rifles, and moved back to Grand Seraucourt again, in reserve. Still concerned about discipline and orderliness, the Battalion commander's orders for the change-over demanded,

By now, it had become clear the expected enemy offensive was imminent; Allied aircraft had successfully photographed German preparations behind their lines. New supply roads had been constructed and shell craters had been turned into concealed trench mortar batteries. Heavily laden motorised and horse-drawn transports had been seen heading into St. Quentin from the east, and in the distance German officers were observed studying British lines. The British answer was increased nightly bombardment of the German front lines, rear areas, and possible areas of troop assembly.

On Sunday, 17 March, the Division celebrated St. Patrick's Day with a Church Parade in the morning and sports in the evening. The 9th Fusiliers' effective strength was recorded that day as 45 Officers, 1058 O.R.s, 37 horses and 18 mules[15]. From that evening on, noise of traffic from behind German lines was heard quite clearly by British troops in the forward trenches.

The following evening, two German deserters from Alsace, belonging to the 414th 'Minenwerfer' Company, came over No Man's Land to give themselves up to troops of the 107th Brigade, declaring their motive as wanting to avoid the coming offensive. The two confirmed Allied assumptions that the offensive was nigh; troops were massing on their front as were batteries of artillery and trench mortars. They reported 100 mortars directly in front of 36th Division lines for the purpose of cutting their wire. It would be accompanied by an artillery bombardment, lasting several hours, as a preliminary to an infantry assault.[16] A number of German prisoners had already been taken which had provided valuable information to this effect, but the two Alsatians' reports were considered the most reliable yet. The information was passed on to Corps Headquarters and the Division scaled up their preparations for the offensive. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary describes their activities from 18 to 20 March as being intensive training during daylight hours with specialist training in the evening.

Just a few nights later, during the night of 20 March, troops of the 61st Division launched a raid on German positions and took more prisoners who gave up the vital fact that their offensive would be launched the following morning : The preparations for Ludendorff's Spring Offensive were by now in their final hours.

The German Army had spread itself along a 43 mile front between Arras, St. Quentin and La Fère. The XVIII Corps under Generalleutnant von Werern, confronted the 36th Division and the left of the 14th Division, to the north-west of their positions, on the southern side of St. Quentin. Two reserve infantry divisions were deployed on the German 3rd and rear trench line, an additional two divisions on the 2nd line and three divisions on the front line, consisting of the following troops:

It is believed it was troops of the 238th Division's 463rd Hansa Towns Regiment which were facing the 108th Brigade trenches. The 238th Division was one of the youngest German Divisions having been raised and trained at Lockstedt, north of Hamburg, in early 1917. It was mostly made up of young men with birth years in 1898 and 1899, and some recovered wounded.[18] The 238th had seen action already in a defensive roll in the Third Battle of Ypres, but the coming assault at St. Quentin would be their first offensive roll of the war.

In his book, "The Kaiser's Battle", Martin Middlebrook quotes many German soldiers' accounts and feelings during the lead-up to the battle. Despite overwhelming odds in their favour, it shows they still had reservations which were perhaps because of their lack of experience. One Leutnant Rudolf Hoffmann of the 463rd Hansa Towns Regiment, for example, commenting on the eve of the offensive, explained,

The British reacted upon the information gained from the 61st's prisoners as soon as they could, but one could be forgiven for believing commanders had completely under-estimated what was awaiting them; their answer was merely to bombard German lines and likely areas of assembly for attack between 02:30 and 03:00. Before they could react, however, the Germans had already begun their own barrage.

The great offensive had arrived.

The organisation of the Division along the front line had remained the same since the 22 February : The 108th Brigade on the right, the 107th in the centre, and the 109th on the left. The attack found the 12th Irish Rifles holding the 108th Brigade front line, followed by the 1st Irish Fusiliers in the trenches of the battle zone, and finally the 9th Irish Fusiliers in reserve. In the 107th's sector, the front was held by the 15th Irish Rifles, with the 1st Irish Rifles in the battle zone, and the 2nd Irish Rifles in reserve. In the 109th's sector, the front was held by the 2nd Inniskillings, the battle zone by the 1st Inniskillings in, and the 9th Inniskillings stayed in reserve.

At 04:35, a heavy German barrage opened up simultaneously on British front and rear positions with every weapon available to them. Trench mortars, mustard gas, chlorine gas, tear gas and smoke canisters were concentrated on the forward trenches, while heavy artillery bombarded rear areas and attempted to dispose of Allied artillery pieces and destroy supply lines. Troops, horses, transport and guns suffered heavily. It has been said that this was "one of the most furious and concentrated bombardments" of the entire war[21]; few have matched it since.

Dawn broke to reveal a heavy morning mist. It has been recorded that by 05:00 visibility was barely 10 yards, and was extremely slow to dissipate throughout the morning. British communications were soon in shambles; telephone wires had been cut by artillery, and runners had a difficult time finding their way through the dense fog and heavy shelling. Their was much pandemonium and confusion. Forward positions could not relay or receive information to Battalion and Divisional Headquarters and communication with the artillery was cut.

German troops advanced en-mass in gas masks behind a creeping barrage, using the fog as cover, and led by divisional 'storm troops' with heavy machine guns. Later reports place the time of infantry attack at 08:30, and the main thrust to the west of the Ulster Division, but confusion is hardly surprising under the circumstances.

The Division was overwhelmed by the onslaught of German Infantry and recoiled under the might of the massive push. Along with all other British troops on the front, they were driven back faster than they believed possible. As the day progressed, breakthroughs of successive lines of British trenches were reported continuously. The push was gaining momentum and German troops were moving faster than British Artillery could reel in their range. Many barrages landed uselessly behind the unremitting advance.

Around midday, a major breakthrough in the 14th Division's lines, to the right of the 36th's sector, meant that German troops were already in the battle zone. This became an immediate and dangerous threat to the 36th. Before long, German troops were in Essigny, and beating on the 108th Brigade's right flank. The 1st Irish Fusiliers turned to meet them and the 9th Irish Fusiliers were sent in to defend the exposed flank but by 14:30, German troops were already 1½ miles south of Essigny.[23] The entire forward zone had by now been captured and the enormity of the German attack began to become quite clear. General Gough, however, was still having problems convincing his own commanders of the gravity of the situation.

Meanwhile, the 108th's 12th Irish Rifles, despite all that was thrown against it, put up stubborn resistance and held on longer than almost any other British unit, despite several direct attacks on their trenches, which at times involved bitter hand-to-hand fighting and attacks with flame throwers. Each time, the Germans were ejected from the 12th Rifles' trenches. But then, soon after midday, the fog lifted and revealed to their horror the extent of the breakthrough - German soldiers could be seen a mile behind them! By this time the Rifles were being attacked from the front and both flanks; they were virtually surrounded, and quite clearly outnumbered. They decided the best course of action was to retreat, but by 16:00, the situation had become so hopeless that they realised their only option was surrender. Some 100 men, many of whom were wounded, destroyed their rifles and gave themselves up to avoid senseless slaughter. In the confusion of the battle, no-one was aware of their gallant stand, and it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of their delaying action, but, following the war, the unit was awarded two DCMs, one MC, and four MMs for the episode.

Meanwhile, the rest of the 108th Brigade was ordered to form a defensive flank half way between Essigny and Lizerolles, and the 9th Inniskillings of the 109th formed up behind the 9th Irish Fusiliers' positions in support, where the front remained steady until dusk. The oncoming darkness gave the Germans the opportunity to bring up reinforcements, which began assembling for the next onslaught. During this, the fighting continued elsewhere; 17:30 the positions held by the remnants of the 15th Rifles' (107th Brigade) and 2nd Inniskillings' (109th Brigade) were surrendered and captured, following the earlier fall of the 108th's 12th Rifles around 16:00.

That evening, both the 9th and 1st Irish Fusiliers fell back to between Artemps and Tugny-et-Pont, until they were ordered to withdraw further around 22:30. They moved a short distance north-west to Happencourt, while General Nugent moved Divisional Headquarters to Estouilly, just north-east of Ham. As they retreated across bridges over the Canal de la Somme, they were blown up by the Division's Engineers and the Ulstermen spent the night behind the fragile interim barrier.

In post war analysis, it has been calculated that 2392 men of the Ulster Division had been taken prisoner alone on the first day of battle.[25]

As for the roll of the Royal Flying Corps, the morning fog had delayed the effective use of aircraft but, by the end of the day, 36 squadrons had been in action and reported losing 16 aircraft and crew, while having shot down 14 enemy. The Germans for their part reported respectively 19 and 8.[26]

The following day was spent in aggressive fighting across the Canal. The Germans brought heavy artillery into Artemps under the cover of morning mist which duly forced the remaining battalions of the 109th to retreat to join the 108th at Happencourt. General Nugent's commanders decided to form a new line of defence on the south of the Canal de St. Quentin, requiring the Division to withdraw to Sommette, which it did by escaping over the Canal at Dury. It has been said, however, that the decision to withdraw during daylight over a distance of almost 9 miles, requiring severe fighting and losses, was actually the result of a misunderstanding between Generals Gough and Maxse. It would be later seen in analysis as a foolhardy and unnecessary surrender of a vital position.

The 107th took up new positions in Eucourt and Cugny, the 109th behind them in support in Brouchy, while the 1st and 9th Irish Fusiliers of the 108th took up positions on the Division's left flank on the Canal's bank. The move was completed by 23:00 and the 36th, with newly attached remnants of other divisions, held a line of about 5 miles length between 1 mile west of Sommette and 1½ miles north-west of Jussy, where they were rejoined by their Divisional Artillery which had been in action with the 20th Division during the day. Divisional Headquarters was also relocated to Fréniches, several miles to the south-west.

The Engineers arrived in late, having been busy blowing all the bridges across the Canal between Ham and Ollézy, although it would soon be revealed that the railway bridge at Pithon had failed to be destroyed; the minor damage done by French Railway Troops was hastily repaired by troops of the German No.3 Foot Guard Regiment, and the Germans were soon crossing in great numbers.

Early next morning, Saturday 23 March, German troops succeeded in forcing a breakthrough of the line in the 14th Division's sector on the Canal at Jussy, opening the way south, and the leak could not be plugged. German troops surged south, having crossed the Canal at many points already by 11:15, and the British were soon in full retreat again. All lines of defence had now been overcome. There was nothing left to stop the German advance and bitter fighting over open country ensued. There was little rest for British troops; those who were not fighting were beating a retreat.

The 16th Irish Rifles were put under the command of the 9th Irish Fusiliers and spent the entire day in action. In the evening, they retreated from a German push on the left flank and spent a relatively quiet night at a farm house outside Villeselve. During that day, along the Division's front, Aubigny, Brouchy, Cugny and Eaucourt had been lost.

In the early hours of 24 March, before dawn, German troops entered Golancourt, just north-west of Villeselve, foiling a planned counter-offensive by the 109th before it was launched. The Brigade's attack was cancelled and the troops remained in their defensive positions. The front at this time ran roughly between Cugny and the south of Golancourt. Fierce fighting continued through the morning along the entire front and at 11:00 the remnants of the Division were ordered to withdraw further south to the town of Guiscard. Gaps in the front created by the staggered withdrawal were utilised by advancing Germans and the Division's sector of the line collapsed. Being attacked now from both the north-east and north-west, they fell back into Villeselve, but were heavily bombed by German Artillery from around 12:00. British troops, backed up by French infantry attempted to hold the line here, but when the French received their own orders to retreat, the British had no choice but to go with them, and fell back through Berlancourt to Guiscard. During the move, German Artillery levelled barrages on both of these towns.

At 23:00, the Division's remaining troops were placed under the command of the French 62nd Division, and ordered to retreat, filtering back through their lines. The remains of the 9th Irish Fusiliers were left as rearguard on the ridge between Berlancourt and Guiscard during the night where Captain Partridge was killed and Captain Vesey wounded, while the rest of the Division retired to Sermaize and Frétoy-le-Château to get some rest.

The movements of the 25 March were extremely confused and reports from different battalions and divisions contradict one another often. The remaining troops of the Ulster Division were ordered to withdraw and reorganise, maintaining a support for French troops now holding the front, and commenced a 15 mile march west. Around midday, they halted for a few hours rest near Avricourt. While there they received orders to head for a new line which would be formed between Bouchoir and Guerbigny.

That day, the German Army picked up the pace of their advance and pressed forward at an alarming pace, covered many miles. Allied troops and civilians with laden carts and wagons filled the roads streaming south and west. The Germans passed through Libermont, and over the Canal du Nord. Further north, the town of Nesle was captured, while to the south west of Libermont German troops soon faced the French along the Noyon-Roye road.

Most of the Ulster Division had arrived in their new lines around 02:00 on 26 March, and were able to sleep around six hours, the longest continuous sleep they had had since the beginning of the offensive began, some six days before. Within a few short hours, while they slept, German troops entered and occupied Roye.

Meanwhile, the 9th Irish Fusiliers were a long way behind the rest of the Division, delayed by their action north of Guiscard the night before. Their retreat was a 30 mile continuous night march from Guiscard to Erches, their designated position at the centre of the new line, along the Guerbigny-Bouchoir road. They route-marched through Bussy to Avricourt, then on to Tilloloy, Popincourt, Grivillers, Marquivillers, and finally via Guerbigny to Erches, where they arrived, completely exhausted, around 11:00 on 26 March.[27]

Large map of the path of retreat

German troops were never far behind. Having taken Roye during the early hours of the morning, they continued to advance on the Bouchoir-Guerbigny line. By mid-morning, they were in Andechy, just 3½ miles away, although advance parties were already making their first contact with the new defences and meeting resistance.

The Ulstermen had established themselves along the line in Brigade order, from left to right, the 107th, the 108th and the 109th, having occupied the remains of old French trenches from 1916. With additional support from the 30th Division in Bouchoir and the 122nd Field Company, the 36th's Lewis Guns formed a formidable barrier which succeeded in holding back repeated German attacks.

Gradually, German troops began to reach the line in greater strength and by 13:00, a great battle was in progress. In the 9th Irish Fusiliers' lines,

The Division put up excellent resistance and fought off many direct attacks. However, the Germans soon realised the Division had no artillery to support them, and it was only a matter of time before they brought forward their own; around dusk they commenced bombardment of Erches. It was followed by a concentrated infantry attack and by 20:00, German troops had forced their way into the town, severing the Ulster Division's line.

Then, during the evening, a sudden and rash series of events brought John George Brew's war to an unexpected end. One account records the incident as follows:

While returning to his lines with other Officers after obtaining permission for a further retreat, he was driven directly into advancing German soldiers. A German bullet stopped the car's engine and the officers jumped out ready for a fight, but the Germans were upon them before they could react. A couple of them were wounded and the little group had no choice but to surrender. So it was to be here in Erches, on 26 March 1918, that Major John George Brew was to fight his final battle. The details surrounding the incident remained vague until a few years after the war, though several days later, the Battalion Casualty Report noted dryly,

It had been a costly retreat to Erches, both in land and lives. The haste of the withdrawal and the ferocity of the German attack had cost the 9th Irish Fusiliers officers ranks 2 killed in action, 6 wounded, 1missing believed wounded, accounting for John George Brew, and 14 missing. John George would appear to be the highest ranking casualty of the 9th Irish Fusiliers for the period. Of the Other Ranks, 15 were killed in action, 75 wounded, 1 wounded and missing, and 406 missing.[31] How many of the Battalion's 420 missing were actually wounded or killed was at that time anyone's guess.

For the remaining troops, it was to be a long night in the trenches under heavy bombardment by the German artillery. British lines of supply were broken and no ammunition, food or water reached the front. At dawn, the Germans attacked again. To the right of their section of the front, the French retreated. To save being trapped, the 109th Brigade moved back with them. The result was the immediate capture of Guerbigny, which posed an instant threat to the 108th Brigade isolated at Erches. The remnants of the 108th then bore the full brunt of the German attack, having failed to receive an order to withdraw. They battled on under incredulous odds until shortly after 11:00 by which time they were virtually annihilated and finally overrun. It has been said that only one officer and nineteen other ranks came away alive.

The remainder of the 107th and 109th Brigades continued to fall back, but the last troops of the 15th Irish Rifles still held on until around midday, before withdrawing towards Arvillers, and meeting what was left of the 1st and 2nd Irish Rifles on the way. The three Battalions together numbered not more than half a company, and in Arvillers, these three officers and 60 men held the line until they were finally relieved by the French on the morning of 28 March. They were the last of the 36th Division to be removed from what was to become known as the "Battle of St. Quentin".

The 108th's ranks barely numbered 300 men following the battle, and the Division's casualties for the ten days following the offensive's opening day on 21 March stood at 7252, of which 185 officers and 5659 other ranks were reported as missing.[33] Among the officers ranks, 127 were reported killed or wounded.[34]

By this time, despite less than satisfying results on his other fronts, Ludendorff's troops, advancing from the original front at St. Quentin, had penetrated some 40 miles deep into British lines and had reached Montdidier. Ludendorff claimed 80,000 Allied prisoners and the capture of 975 guns. Total British casualties in those few days stood at a staggering 300,000. He bathed in his success, but his over-optimism led him to miscalculate his and his enemy's next moves; he failed to adequately follow up and the Allied forces, bolstered by the arrival of 12 divisions of American troops, repelled his march to the Channel coast and brought it to a grinding halt.

Although they did not fully realise it at the time, this was, at last, the turn of tide which the Allied armies had so long awaited. It was the beginning of the end; something for which they had prayed, but closer than they dared dream.

-o-

Back in Portadown, late that month, John George's wife Annie's worst fears were realised when a telegram from the War Office arrived stating,

It would be another month before Annie would hear from the War Office again when she received a second telegram informing her,

She tried to console herself with the fact that as a prisoner, John had probably survived the war. But on 25 May 1918, an unexpected letter shattered Annie's hopes; it brought crushing news.

John George's Army Service Record shows the report which was received from the German Red Cross in German. It was correctly and fully translated without error. The War Office followed up their May letter with another on 6 June confirming,

Comforting, it was not.

The circumstances surrounding John George's capture and death were, however, to remain a mystery for several years and Annie Brew's grief was only deepened by the unknown. Though she had attempted to find out what had occurred, it was not until a full three years after his death that she would obtain the answer, when she received a letter dated 6 April 1921 - ironically three years to the day - from Colonel M. J. Furnell. It read, 

John George left his widow, Annie, and 2 children, 9 year old John Kenneth and 7 year old Marion, in Portadown, County Armagh, Northern Ireland. His death is recorded in the "Army Officers War Records of Deaths 1914-1921", and reads simply,

He is buried in Roye New British Cemetery, outside the town of Roye, 40km south-east of Amiens, in Picardy, France. New British Cemetery contains some 417 graves of Allied soldiers gathered from temporary graves in surrounding areas, most of whom were either German prisoners of war or died during the retreat of March 1918.

Next Chapter - Conclusion