Major John George Brew - 1917: Messines, Ypres and Cambrai

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1917 - Messines, Ypres and Cambrai

New drafts were added to the Ulster Division to replace the losses incurred on the Somme, and by late July the Division was positioned in Messines in Belgium. Here, the high water table meant the possibility of digging only shallow trenches which then had to be fortified by sandbags. The trenches were always flooded and dirty and were under the additional threat of German tunnelling and bombing. A story is told of a very good 20 foot deep trench dug by the Royal Engineers in August. By September there was a foot of water in the bottom of it, in October it rose to two feet, and by November the water had risen to the top of the stairs. Someone with a sense of humour added a sarcastic sign, "The R. E. Swimming Bath".

Life in the Allied trenches carried on much as it had before and settled back into a form of routine monotony, though the Autumn of 1916 was seen as a welcome quiet time for the Ulstermen while the Germans were still concentrated on the Somme, far to their south.

In an effort to alleviate the monotony often experienced in the trenches, several amateur newspapers of different levels of quality sprung up in the British Army. One of them, the "B.E.F. Times", originating in the 12th Sherwood Foresters, amused the troops by summing up trench life with it's tongue-in-cheek attitude to Winter mud and the hardships of the average soldier on the Western Front.

Back at the business of war, much time was spent improving and strengthening defences. General Plumer was encouraging the use of mining as an offensive weapon and Tunnelling Companies were busy driving long shafts under No Man's Land in the direction of the German lines at their strongest defences.

However, the German Army, holding the high ground, as it always seemed to be to the average British soldier, also occupied it's time the same way, using all it's available expertise and technology. Four lines of trenches ran parallel to and west of the Wytschaete-Messines road, defended by a wide area of wire and pillboxes. Thick concrete dugouts were erected, hidden behind farm houses, bridges, and natural contours in the landscape which afforded ample protection from Allied machine gun and artillery fire. German miners were also hard at work, tunnelling their way towards British lines. It was a race against time, an attempt to discover the efforts of the opposition - and destroy them, and hope that their own tunnels would not be discovered. It was not seldom that shafts would collapse or be bombed, trapping men below ground and burying them alive. It was a dangerous job, but Tunnelling teams on both sides were known as courageous men, who were highly respected and admired by others soldiers.

After recuperation from his wound and a break at home, John George Brew was sent back to the front where he rejoined the 9th Irish Fusiliers at Messines on 10 December 1916.[2] Christmas passed quietly and then, at the end of January, John George was given the opportunity to take temporary command of the Battalion for a few days while the Commanding Officer was absent.[3]

In early 1917, the strength of British forces in France had grown to some 1,200,000 men, the strength of French forces to around 2,600,000, and that of the Belgians to about 100,000, totalling altogether around 3,900,000 Allied men opposite an estimated circa 2,500,000 Germans, but the war had nonetheless begun to stagnate. The casualty figures continued to increase while movement on the front remained meagre. At home, the civilian population was becoming unsettled. It was realised that the war needed fresh ideas and strategies and this was made felt by the replacement of the Asquith Government, on 11 December 1916, by Prime Minister David Lloyd George who won on the promise of more vigorous and effective leadership.

In France, a French plan to avoid offensives on the Somme, but instead to attack at each side of it, meant that British forces must occupy the entire French-held Somme front, from his current positions as far south as Roye. This strategy was met with great scepticism by General Haig who objected to an extension of the front and a thinning-out of the density of his troops on that line. Additionally he wanted to keep British troops available for an attack at Flanders, which he had been long planning. In the least, he felt, the French strategy should be postponed until May when simultaneous Russian and Italian attacks were planned, but he was over-ruled. To appease him, he was promised two additional divisions to complete the task. Not satisfied with this, he argued further until he received eight. Disagreement over strategies and leadership ensued and Franco-British relations began to decay.

However, before any plans could be set in motion, the Germans would unwittingly disable them. Anticipating a new Allied offensive on the Somme front, the German Commander, General Erich Ludendorff, decided to consolidate his manpower and supplies by voluntarily withdrawing to his rear line defences, effectively buying himself time to strengthen his forces. Following a transformation of their rear line to a new front line, which they named 'Siegfried' (the British called it 'Hindenburg'), the German forces fell back in stages from 23 February to 16 March, when the main withdrawal took place. But in preparation for their retreat, they adopted what we would call today a 'burnt earth policy' and systematically destroyed everything between their old and new front lines.

In mid-March, soon after the German retreat on the Somme, the width of the Messines Front held by the Ulster Division was reduced to just one brigade giving the remaining two the opportunity to relax and train behind lines. One brigade was kept near Flêtre, while the other trained in Lumbres, west of St. Omer. During this time, John George Brew was promoted to the rank of Major.

The German withdrawal on the Somme Front had come unexpectedly and had caught both the British and French unawares. In an attempt to exploit the situation, belated, ill-prepared and costly attacks ensued by the British in their Spring Offensive at Vimy Ridge on 9 April, and by the French east and west of Riems on 16 April. But nothing was to be seen of the expected breakthrough; all chance of surprise was thrown away by fundamental Allied mistakes, and flawed by a well prepared enemy.  

Hence, the main Allied concentration was moved to Belgium's Ypres sector in May and June and preparations were soon underway in the Ulster Division lines for the Allies' second offensive on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. Despite all that was going on, there was an air of calm among the men:

Divisional Headquarters moved forward to the area west of Dranouter on 27 May, where they came under a fatal attack by German artillery. The following day, Headquarters was moved again, to a prepared command post and signal station on the western slopes of Kemmel Hill. Three days later, the commencement of the Battle of Messines was heralded, as always, by preliminary bombardment which lasted an entire week.

The 36th Division objective would be a line from Lumm Farm to a rail cutting on the Wytschaete-Oosttaverne road, involving the complete 107th and 109th Brigades with the 11th and 12th Royal Irish Rifles from the 108th in support. The two remaining battalions of the 108th, the 9th Irish Fusiliers and 13th Irish Rifles were planned for a reserve roll and would not go over the top until the evening of 7th, until which time they would be positioned at Fort Victoria. However, during the week long preliminary bombardment, it was they who would have to hold the front line.

Careful preparation had been done in order to avoid previous mistakes. A model of the ridge was made behind the lines and aerial photographs were studied following artillery barrages to gauge their effectiveness. If it was deemed that a particular structure or trench had not been sufficiently shelled, it was noted and given special attention during the following day's barrage. Officers of flanking battalions and divisions attended each other's briefings in the days preceding the infantry assault to ensure that even the most trivial detail would be shared.

Supplies of rations and ammunition were better organised, as were preparations for the evacuation of wounded. The light railway, or 'trench tramway' as it was called, would play an integral part in the speedy removal of casualties to waiting ambulances on a turning circle especially prepared for the purpose. The Ambulances would then bring wounded to the 108th Field Ambulance Dressing Station just east of Dranouter, from where they could be quickly and easily conveyed to Casualty Clearing Stations at Bailleul.

The days leading up to the infantry attack were given letters of the alphabet as a code. The day of attack was called 'Z' day, and the five days previous 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', and 'Y'. From 'U' day, Allied artillery intensified it's bombardment of German dugouts and bunkers, and billets further behind their lines. Barrages concentrated on their lines of communication day and night, sporadically mixed with gas shells. Whirlwind 30-minute barrages were also conducted on Messines and Wytschaete during which time every available weapon, from the largest to the smallest, was trained on German lines.

Diversionary attacks and raids on enemy trenches were made by the Division to take prisoners and gain intelligence information. On 5 June, for example, under cover of artillery, the 9th Irish Fusiliers made a raid on the Spanbroek salient, taking one officer and 30 other ranks prisoner, at the cost of two killed and six wounded.

Rain fell all day and all evening on 6 June, 'Y' day, but the plan proceeded on schedule, and Allied artillery laid down their barrage on the German lines. At 22:00 107 and 109 Brigades, having been camped beyond the range of German shelling to the south of Locre and south-west of Dranouter respectively, moved up to their start positions. Each man had been issued chewing gum, lime juice, oranges and Oxo cubes. Upon arrival, they were issued hot drinks and settled in to await zero hour. That night, some 80,000 Allied troops were lined up across the entire front, all forbidden to smoke or make any noise.

At 03:10, zero hour was marked by the simultaneous detonation of nineteen massive mines under German lines, four of which were in front of the Ulster Division. So great were they, that dirt and debris rained down on both German and Allied trenches for several minutes afterwards. Although Allied soldiers knew of the plan in advance, the effect was far greater than expected; the absolute power of the explosions awed those who witnessed it and the thunderous roar was even heard in England. Men of the 8th Irish Rifles, who were standing at the time, were blown to the ground and the body of a German officer was found later having fallen from the sky some 200 yards behind the Division's lines. This was the signal for the artillery to open up and the infantry to advance. The Ulstermen moved forward under cover of almost every available form of weapon - mining, artillery, trench mortars, tanks, smoke and gas. The front was a mere 9 miles long, but there were some 2,340 pieces of artillery deployed along it; the Ulster front alone held 192 field guns and howitzers, and all were firing at once.

The effect on the Germans was immeasurable; the tactical advantage resulted in excellent gains along the entire front, and troops were able to make their initial advance with little or no resistance whatsoever. Stunned by the quick succession of detonation, barrage and infantry assault, hundreds of dazed German prisoners were taken. Many others were found dead in their dugouts with no obvious sign of a cause of death - they had been killed by concussion from the mines' blasts.

The protestant Ulstermen fought alongside the 16th Irish Division, who were Catholics taken mostly part from the ranks of the National Volunteers, the Ulster Volunteers' old arch enemy; to their right was the 25th Division of the 2nd ANZAC. Only two machine guns opened up on the 36th, more precisely on the 109th Brigade, but they were promptly put out of action. Though more repelling German troops were met the further the advance moved, by 04:50 all goals had nonetheless been reached according to schedule.

A second wave of fresh troops from the 11th and 12th Irish Rifles, the two supporting battalions from the 108th Brigade, advanced at 06:50 under the cover of a raised barrage, and moved forward to extend the gains of the first wave. A few stubborn positions resisted, mainly pillboxes, but they were soon taken care of and the Division's objectives were successfully attained, despite the continuing nuisance of counter-barrages from German artillery positioned further east.

Following nightfall, the two remaining battalions of the 108th, thereunder the 9th Irish Fusiliers, moved forward and joined the rest of their Brigade on the front, under the command of General Griffith. This enabled the relief of the 107th and 109th Brigades, who retired to the old British lines. The day had been warm and bright, according to the 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary, but heavy rain fell in the evening, accompanied by thunder and lightening. At 01:30, the Battalion relieved the 10th and 15th Irish Rifles on what was known as the 'Black Line', between Lumm and Ochre Farms. It was a long and sleepless night for them but the expected German counter-attack never came, despite several alarms.

The darkness gave the Royal Engineers the chance to lay wire along the new front line, and by dawn it was clear the ridge was firmly in Allied hands. No casualties were reported by the 9th Fusiliers for the 24 hours up to 12:00[5], in spite of continued heavy shelling from German positions during the day. The new front had been established and the warm day was welcomed by the men while they busied themselves fortifying it. The 9th remained on the 'Black Line' until 15:30 in the afternoon when they were moved forward to relieve the 11th Irish Rifles on the 'Mauve Line'. German troops kept up fire on the Fusiliers until around midnight, but they were kept busy throughout the entire night strengthening the line.

After dark that evening, the 9th was relieved by the 8th Duke of Wellington's Regiment and moved back with other battalions of the 108th to join the 107th and 109th already bivouacking in the rear on Kemmel Hill.

Upon retirement, the 9th Fusiliers reported 3 O.R.s killed and 16 wounded.[7] For the same period, the Division as a whole reported casualties of 61 officers and 1,058 other ranks killed and wounded, accounting for the strength of around one entire battalion. Different estimates consider losses in the original assault alone to have been around 700 men, tallying over 60% of the total figure for the four days on the front line. Other divisions, such as the Australians of 2 ANZAC, suffered much more severely, but it was universally considered that Allied troops had inflicted three times as many losses on their German counterparts as they had themselves suffered. For their part, the Ulster Division was proud to report having taken some 30 officers and 1200 other ranks prisoner, though they were unable to capture any guns in their sector before their withdrawal.

The Germans retreated from the Oosttaverne Line on 11 June and fell back on their new line of defence, the Warneton Line, which effectively ended the battle. As a result of the German failure, their commander, General von Laffert, was relieved from his post by General Sixt von Armin for the alleged tactical error of placing his two reserve divisions too far to the rear to be of any immediate use when the British attacked.

The Battle of Messines was seen as a huge success by the British and morale among the troops soared. The week long preparatory bombardment had meant there was no effect of surprise whatsoever, but it was not necessary. It had been a meticulously planned attack in strength, using military intelligence and the first real strategy seen on the battlefield since the outbreak of war.

By 12 June, the new positions having been consolidated, the men of the Ulster Division could worry about other things for a while. The 9th Fusiliers remained in camp to rest and 160 men were able to enjoy a bath during the morning.[8] The Division stayed in the area for a further month, each brigade taking their turn on the front and then in reserve again, where training was continued. 

John George was to remain there a full three months, but on 7 July, while he was on his way back to England, the rest of the Division was moved back to St. Omer where they enjoyed a well-earned 12 days rest and were able to bathe in the warmth of the Summer sun. As always, divisional sports were a highlight of breaks behind the lines, and on 23 July a gymkhana was held at Acquin. The following day, the Division was moved north to Wizernes and came under the command of 19th Corps of the 5th Army. By the end of July, they were positioned between Watou and Poperinge, in earnest preparation for their next battle, a supporting roll in the imminent Third Battle of Ypres, an attempt to win the northern half on the Ypres Salient.

In France at the same time, following the failure of the French offensive at Champagne and it's horrendous losses, disgruntlement with leadership was mounting within French ranks which led to a wave of mutinies and desertions. Having emerged in the French 2nd Colonial Division in May, the contagious fervour soon affected 16 separate Corps. The barely 500 desertions of 1914 were eclipsed by over 21,000 in 1917.[10] French troops maintained their willingness to defend their trenches but refused foolhardy attacks. They saw no sense in attacking impregnable enemy defences which in their eyes brought nothing but death and suffering. Although a change in French leadership was able to restore order, 23 soldiers were executed in its wake, and over 100 others deported to the colonies. French General Henri Pétain set about the difficult task of rebuilding confidence and strength, but by the end of the war, some 630 French soldiers had been sentenced to death for desertion. According to official French statistics, only 75 executions were actually carried out, but it is rumoured that many more were shot at and behind the front line in unofficial executions.

Russia, too, had problems of her own attempting to counter the revolution which had broken out at home in March, and which was to culminate in her departure from the war in October. She had already ceased to be a major player and the situation had relieved Germany of much pressure on the Eastern Front.

With the problems of disgruntlement among the French forces and bickering between French and British commanders over leadership, the Allied war effort had been severely weakened. Despite the strength of British forces - some 64 divisions - the British commanders were under heavy pressure as they realised they would have to carry the weight of the remainder of 1917's offensives.

On 31 July, the opening day of the new Ypres offensive, sometimes referred to as "Passchendale", twelve divisions advanced along an 11 mile front, following almost ten days of intense artillery bombardment. Heavy rains began to fall that day and continued for many days into August. Aided by artillery barrages, the already muddy terrain was made impassable; advance against German pillboxes and wire was impossible. The Ypres Salient had already become synonymous with mud, blood and horror and this episode would be no different; many men sunk in the mire, drowned and disappeared, buried forever. Despite initial successes and land gains, hopes for a repeat of the quick success at Messines faded by the day. Infantry, tanks and artillery became bogged in the quagmire, and no substantial gains could be made. It was impossible to find justification for the extreme casualty figures.

For their part, the Ulster Division went into battle in support of the 55th Lancaster Division's attack, initially carrying supplies and clearing casualties, then moving into the front line just two days later to relieve them. But their major roll was to be in a component of the Ypres campaign which has become known as the Battle of Langemark, which commenced on 16 August.

Backed up the 5th Division, the 36th fought alongside the 16th Irish Division again as they had in Messines. On the Division's left flank was the 48th Division, while within Divisional lines, the 109th Brigade was on the left, the 108th on the right, and the 107th remained in reserve. The 9th Irish Fusiliers were positioned at Pommern Redoubt to the far right of the 108th Brigade lines. They advanced at 04:45 on a two company front, A and B followed by C and D, in the direction of Hill 35 with the 7th/8th Irish Fusiliers of the 16th Division on their right and the 13th Irish Rifles of their own Division on their left. Making excellent gains at first, in spite of the muddy conditions, considerable resistance was soon met. The German Artillery shortened it's range and C and D Companies suffered heavily. They struggled hard to take Hill 35 but found German wire mostly still in place and pill-boxes still operational. The advance was brought to a halt and the German guns began to concentrate on them, causing heavy casualties. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sommerville, was killed in action and the battalion was driven back. Other battalions of the Division made few gains despite their efforts. Many died in the German counter-barrage, which was followed up by a counter-attack with infantry and succeeded in pushing the British back to their starting line along the entire front.

That night, both the 108th and 109th Brigades were relieved by the 107th, which had remained in reserve, and withdrawn by bus to Winnizeele. The following evening, on the night of 17/18 August, the 107th was relieved by a brigade of the 61st Division and the Ulster Division was completely withdrawn from the Ypres front. The suffering was great, and once again the Division reported massive casualties. The 9th Irish Fusiliers alone reported 36 killed in action, 323 wounded, 12 cases of shell-shock, 83 missing, and 2 missing believed killed - a total of 456 men.[11]

Between 2 and 18 August, in just over two weeks, the Division as a whole had lost 144 officers and 3441 other ranks killed, wounded, gassed, and missing, about the equivalent of three whole battalions. But since the beginning of June, the Division's casualties amounted to a massive 205 officers and 4510 other ranks, accounting for approximately one in three men! Hardly surprising, the losses seriously effected the troops' morale.

After four days rest in Winnizeele, seriously under strength, the demoralised Division was sent by train back to the Somme, where memories were stirred of the great battle and the terrible defeat they had suffered there just over a year before. In the closing days of August, they detrained at Bapaume, a town which was still behind the lines at the time they had left, and took up position on the Hindenburg Line facing the town of Cambrai, to the north-east. Here, reinforcements joined the Ulstermen to bring them up to strength, though many of these were from mainland England; the "Ulster" in the Division's name was destined to slowly become an anachronism. Additionally, the 107th Brigade gained the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, while the 8th and 9th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were amalgamated. Within the 108th Brigade, the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers were bolstered by about 300 men of the now dismounted North Irish Horse, and the 11th and 13th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were amalgamated, while two external battalions, the 7th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles and the 2nd Rifle Battalion, were amalgamated and posted to the 108th.

Having been on a senior officers training course for several months, John George Brew was fortunate enough to have missed the third Ypres campaign at Langemark. He returned to duty with the Ulster Division on 3 October and assumed 2nd in command of the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers[12]. By this time, preparations were well under way for the next offensive, at Cambrai. The Germans were still occupied on the Ypres Salient and would not be expecting any assault by the Allied forces before Winter. The strategists were gambling on this assumption to stage a surprise attack on the town. Part of the plan would be the first major tank attack in strength, which was to be followed by an immediate infantry assault. The aim was to overwhelm the enemy before he knew what was happening, with the intent of clearing the German Army from the entire Cambrai area.

The 36th Division's goal would be to take the German trenches between the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the Canal du Nord. This would be the responsibility of the 109th Brigade while both 107th and 108th would remain in reserve for follow-up and mopping up in another part of the battle.

However, the German trenches on this front were different to those which the Ulstermen had encountered on the Somme and in Ypres. These were a part of the Hindenburg Line, to where the German Army had voluntarily fallen back during the previous March. They had been built at their own leisure with the aide of the forced labour of thousands of Russian Prisoners of War. Consisting of two great lines of wide, deep and solidly built trenches with deep dugouts, well fortified with pillboxes and several lines of wire, they presented a formidable obstacle.

Behind the front, British troops made practice attacks on dummy trenches built to resemble those which they would be assaulting, as they had done in preparation for the attack at Messines in June. Field Marshal Haig felt it was essential they knew what they were facing and, in the event their officers should fall, that his troops should know exactly what to do and how to carry on alone to achieve their objectives. Practice runs and briefings were repeated daily until all knew what was expected of them. Fortunately, the weather was good, and preparations were able to continue at high speed. Morning mists worked also to their advantage as many preparations could be undertaken in the proximity of the front line which might otherwise have been impossible. Roads were cleared, supply routes built, and the necessary equipment brought to the front and camouflaged. Tanks were brought forward and hidden in the forests; their tracks over open country, which would be visible to German reconnaissance aircraft under normal circumstances, were also well hidden by the fog. In the first two weeks of the month, the Division provided parties of between 200 - 600 soldiers each day for unloading ammunition from supply trains at Ytres Station. During this time, John George Brew took over temporary command of the 9th Fusiliers while the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. Kelly, took two weeks leave.[13]

Nightly bombardment of German positions and supply roads was carried out to harass them and raids were made on their lines to check defences and gain intelligence information. One such raid, on the evening of 3 November, consisted of three parties from the 9th Irish Fusiliers, totalling together four officers and 67 other ranks. They made a large raid on German trenches to the south of the Hermies-Havrincourt road and east of the Canal du Nord. Passing through gaps in German wire, they stormed enemy positions and killed some 40 men, but with the loss to themselves of one killed, three missing believed killed, and 15 wounded.

On 18 November, the 9th Irish Fusiliers moved from Bertincourt back to Barastre, some 8 miles behind the front line where they spent the night with the rest of the 108th Brigade and paraded for a final inspection by the Commanding Officer the following morning. That afternoon, the eve of the offensive, they moved forward again at 16:30 to their start positions in Vélu Wood.

Next morning, under the cover of morning mist and without the customary artillery barrage announcing the beginning of an attack, 381 British tanks raced forward on a six mile front with supporting infantry. The surprise was complete as the Germans were quite obviously used to the habitual several days' advance warning by the artillery.

As no tanks had been allotted to the Division's sector, and as no artillery was allowed prior to the attack, the job of the 109th was actually made that much more difficult. Machine Gunners were to move up with heavy Vickers machine guns and spray fire down the wide Hindenburg trenches, allowing accompanying troops to move up unhindered. The 9th Fusiliers remained in reserve during the morning but moved forward to a position 500 yards north-east of Vélu Wood two hours after the assault began.

The effect of surprise was, for all intents and purposes, a magnificent success; enemy wire, which would have stopped or slowed infantry, was flattened by the tanks. The infantry followed the tanks through and completed the 'mop-up' work, a time consuming and dangerous job as many Germans still hid in bunkers up to 30 feet below the surface. But, by the end of the first day, 5 miles had been gained, accounting for more than had been achieved in months of fighting in either the First Battle of the Somme or the Third Battle of Ypres. All three main lines of German trenches had been overrun, and the tanks were advancing into open country. Hundreds of Germans, stunned by the speed of the advance, were swiftly taken prisoner and herded back behind British lines.

The 109th attack also went well. Their first objectives were taken with relative ease. Many Germans were killed by machine-gun fire and 70 prisoners of the 20th Landwehr Division were taken, along with two machine guns. The advance continued down communication trenches, and guards were left behind by advancing battalions at the entrance to underground bunkers to await supporting troops who would complete their clearing, referred to as 'mopping up'. Once cleared of enemy troops, a dugout would be posted with a large sign clearly stating "MOPPED". The Brigade's first objective was reached a few minutes behind schedule, around 09:30, and soon began on stage two. With a hard push, the Brigade drove the enemy before them, and despite some at times strong resistance, the remainder of the German troops in their sector fled across the Canal. The 11th Inniskillings crossed the Cambrai-Bapaume road at around 15:30 that afternoon, and settled down to consolidate their position, having attained their set objective. By the end of the day, the 109th had managed to take 509 prisoners and, to their great pleasure, also  captured a German stores depot.

The 9th Irish Fusiliers, meanwhile, had moved forward at 13:30 in the afternoon to Broken Bridge and Yorkshire Bank, where they found overnight shelter in dugouts from the heavy rain which had begun to fall. Next day, the advance continued, and the 109th managed to reach the outskirts of Moeuvres. The Irish Fusiliers followed the 109th forward with the 108th's other three battalions, all the while remaining behind the advance which was continuing north of the Cambrai-Bapaume road. The Fusiliers reached old German lines near Lock 7, where they spent the night in dugouts recently occupied by German troops.

The Brigade was up early the following morning, 22 November, and set out at 06:30 for a position north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. They arrived an hour later and prepared to relieve the 109th. At last they were to see some action. The Irish Fusiliers were planned for deployment in the attack on the village of Inchy, but it relied entirely on the success of the 12th Irish Rifles' attack on Moeuvres. The Fusiliers had to wait therefore in reserve for the order to finally begin their attack.

But by late afternoon it had become clear that the attack by the 12th Rifles had failed to decisively take the village; they had fought their way into it, but had been pushed back out again by a German counter-attack shortly before 18:00. Realising the gravity of the situation, the order was given that the 9th Fusiliers should disregard their previous objective and move forward to support them. At 20:30 they counter-attacked on the retaken village but they, too, failed and were forced to retire to their start trenches where they spent a cold, wet, and uneasy night.

It was soon clear the Germans had recovered from their original shock and had begun to organise counter measures. They changed their defensive position to the offensive and were counter-attacking in strength. The Allied advance was slowed and in some places stopped completely. Allied tank crews and their accompanying troops had begun to tire and the assault's fatal flaw suddenly became apparent; British strategists had failed to plan for reserves. The advantage could not capitalised upon and the new line could not be held. Now it was too late. By the time it was realised, it was impossible to bring reserves up fast enough to repel German attacks and consolidate on gains. The initiative fell to German commanders who only too happily exploited the opportunity.

At 10:30 next morning, with the support of the 2nd Irish Rifles, the 9th Irish Fusiliers and 12th Irish Rifles attacked Moeuvres anew, this time succeeding in taking most of the village. The joy was, however, extremely short lived as German troops counter-attacked again just before midday from trenches east of the village, and aggressive fighting continued throughout the afternoon. Although the attack was beaten back, the men were tiring, and, receiving no relief from further reinforcements, the battalions were forced to evacuate Moeuvres, and leave it to the Germans; by 17:00, they were once again back in their start trenches to the south-west of the town. That evening, the 9th Fusiliers reported one officer killed, six officers wounded and 82 casualties in the other ranks for the previous 48 hours.[15]

At dawn they were relieved by the 11th Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade, who had spent the previous day in reserve, and were withdrawn to Hermies, about four miles to the south, where they spent the following day resting. Snow had begun to fall and winds had risen making it very unpleasant to be out in, but in the evening the men were moved again a short distance, to Beaumetz-les-Cambrai, where they spent an extremely cold night in tents. The next day, they were moved six miles southwards, through Vélu and Bertincourt to Rocquigny, where they remained the next 48 hours. While there, many took the opportunity to bathe at last and take issue of a clean change of uniform, while others refitted and replaced damaged or lost equipment.[16]

Two days later, the Ulster Division was entrained at 20:30 at nearby Ytres, for Beaumetz-lés-Loges, south-west of Arras, for some rest. They arrived at 02:45 on 30 November and marched some 30 minutes to billets at Simencourt.[17]

They had barely arrived, when, later that same day, news came through of an massive German counter-attack at Cambrai. The Germans had used the same strategy as the British had just used on them and attacked without advance warning by artillery barrage, overrunning the British before they realised what had happened. The German commanders had the added advantage of having reinforcements which had literally just arrived from the now defunct Eastern Front and were sent straight to the front; the British still had none.

The Ulster Division, though weary, were immediately recalled to the front. Leaving Simencourt the same day at 14:30, the Division had to march back to Cambrai, there being no trains available to carry them.

On 3 December the 108th Brigade was placed under the command of the 61st Division and deployed in the Couillet valley the following day where they relieved the 88th Brigade. The following night, the 109th was moved forward and relieved 61st Division troops holding the front at Welsh Ridge. The Germans had already made enormous gains, taken thousands of British prisoners and hundreds of guns; bodies were lying everywhere along the front. Attack and repulse followed counter-attack and retreat for several days, but eventually the 109th drove the Germans off the ridge.

From 9-12 December, the 9th Fusiliers remained behind the front in support of the rest of 108th Brigade, and spent much of their time carrying wire to the front. At dusk on 12 December, the Fusiliers relieved the 2nd Irish Rifles on the front line on a three company front, with 'D' Company in support. In their sector in the valley, the 108th had less difficulty holding the line than the 109th. It seemed the German troops in the area merely wished to consolidate their position and re-establish posts in the sunken road there. Early on the morning of 13 December, however, the Battalion received information that they should expect an attack on their lines at 06:30. Already at 04:30 they captured a prisoner from the German 6th Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment, then stood to at 05:30 in advance of the expected assault, which never arrived.[18]

Within a short time, further advance on either side had failed, the battle degenerated into a war of attrition. Aggressive German shelling continued on British rear areas both day and night, and German aeroplanes often strafed British trenches, causing many casualties in the Division.

Casualties of war were indeed high, but the poor weather and the effects of three weeks exposure to the elements had also taken a great toll on the men. Their physical condition had become extremely poor. Not surprisingly, many had fallen ill and required extensive medical treatment. They were cold, wet, dirty and tired.

General Nugent expressed his concerns to his Commanders, aided by a strongly worded medical report from the RAMC demanding some much needed rest for the Division. Finally, from 14-16 December, during heavy snowfall, the utterly exhausted men withdrew in stages, relieved by battalions and brigades of other divisions. 

As they retired on 16 October, the 9th Irish Fusiliers spited the Germans with a last quick kick in the shins. At 17:00 they stormed a machine-gun post of the German 6th Reserve Infantry Regiment with mills bombs, bayoneted the gunner, drove the others into retreat, and captured the machine gun. At 21:00 they were finally able to retire when they were relived by the 7th Royal Fusiliers, and marched to Metz-le-Coutre in the rear.[19]

Despite the final loss of the campaign, through one main flaw - lack of follow-up, the Allied Generals had gained valuable experience and learnt important lessons for future assaults. Assault without artillery had found new approval, and, snubbing sceptics, the tank had at last proved it's worthiness.

After a night in Metz, the Fusiliers were moved to Etricourt, where they were billeted in tents. On 18 December they were entrained at Etricourt for Mondicourt, but owing to heavy snow, the train did not arrive until midnight. Detraining was followed by a march through deep snow to billets in the village of Coullemont. Several days were spent in the area, and the men were kept busy clearing roads of snow, cleaning up, bathing and parading for inspections. Staunch Protestants, the spiritual well-being of the Ulstermen was as important to them as their physical well-being, and on Sunday morning, 23 December, they attended a church service held in the village of Humbercourt. Two days later, Christmas Day 1917, the men attended a divine service at 10:30, followed by company Christmas dinners that afternoon, each of which was visited by the Commanding Officer to say a few words. For many of the men, this was their third Christmas in France, and, although they were able to enjoy a peaceful Christmas away from the front, all hoped and prayed they would be home for the next one.

After the short pause for Christmas, the men were moved by rail from Coullemont to Boves, south-east of Amiens, and spent the final days of the year hard at work clearing snow, sandbagging, route-marching and parading, an agenda which also included kit inspections and musketry instruction and practice.

The high hopes which began the year had bogged down in the muds of Belgium and France, additionally complicated by Russian and French internal problems. The problems in Russia were not to be underestimated; they undermined Allied morale and almost led them to the brink of defeat. Germany used Russia's weakness on the Eastern Front to her advantage and surged forward, driving Russian troops from their strongholds. Following a further putsch by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, when Lenin took power, Russia sued for peace and pulled out of the war, thus freeing German troops to strengthen their Western Front.

The second half of the year had seen limited gains by the French at Verdun and Chemin des Dames, and besides the success of Messines and the initial blow against the Germans in the ill-prepared Cambrai tank attack, there was not much to speak of in the way of Allied accomplishment or clear-cut victory in Europe that year to justify the excessive casualty figures; the 1917 Arras, Ypres and Cambrai campaigns alone had cost the British some 420,000 casualties. The war was at a stalemate and no-one knew how much longer it would continue.

Britain had now been at war for over 3 years. The troops were tired. They were sick of the mud and wet feet, and fed up with the monotony of rations and life in the trenches. But in typical British fashion, soldiers poked fun at the things which irked them. One man wrote a rhyme for the "B.E.F. Times",

Everyone held out hopes that the new year would finally see the end of it all. But for Allied commanders and strategists at this time, there was still a major and very serious reason for concern. Since October 1917, the number of Allied infantry divisions on the Western Front had not increased. On the contrary, it had fallen by seven, while the existing Divisions were on average 2000 men under normal strength.[21] All the while, German troop numbers had steadily increased, nourished by train-loads arriving from the now defunct Russian front. Allied commanders were justifiably becoming increasingly worried as they realised the Allied advantage in numbers was dwindling by the day. Between the end of October and the end of December, the number of German divisions on the front had risen by over 20 and more were on their way. For the Allies, large numbers of American troops were still months off, and by early 1918, it had become quite apparent that the Germans now held the upper hand.

Next Chapter - The Retreat from St. Quentin